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SUNLIGHT AND SHADOWS:
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS ON PRIVACY, PUBLICITY, AND FREE
EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
Erin Coyle
I.

INTRODUCTION

A gossip and news website, in 2012, posted a grainy video
showing a well-known professional wrestler and actor having sex
with a woman who was not his wife.1 The celebrity, known as Hulk
Hogan, sued for invasion of privacy, violation of his right of
publicity, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.2 A district court of appeals held that
a temporary injunction preventing the website from publishing
excerpts of the video and a written report on Hogan’s affair was “an
unconstitutional prior restraint” on a matter of public concern.3 A
jury, however, found that publishing the video invaded Hogan’s
privacy.4 The jury awarded more than $100 million in damages.5
Fear of such large damage awards may eventually deter others from
addressing the private lives of celebrities like Hogan, who have
sought the spotlight in some arenas, and who may turn around and
Assistant

professor in the Manship School of Mass Communication at Louisiana State
University. The author thanks the Joe D. Smith/Hibernia Professorship in Media and Politics
for supporting this research. The author also thanks Louis Day, Ruth Walden, and Ian
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1 A.J. Daulerio, Even for a Minute, Watching Hulk Hogan Have Sex in a Canopy Bed is
Not Safe For Work but Watch it Anyway (Oct. 4, 2012, 2:15 PM),
http://gawker.com/5948770/even-for-a-minute-watching-hulk-hogan-have-sex-in-a-canopybed-is-not-safe-for-work-but-watch-it-anyway; Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 8:12-cv02348-T-27TBM, 2012 WL 5509624 at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2012).
2 Bollea, No. 8:12-cv-02348-T-27TBM, 2012 WL 5509624 at *2.
3 Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
4 Jury Verdict & Settlement, Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, JVR No. 1603280023 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 21, 2016).
5 Id.
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sue members of the press for shining a spotlight that is unwanted
when celebrities enter other arenas.6
Laws that protect invasions of privacy caused by disclosures
of personal information inherently may conflict with the
constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and press.7 The U.S.
Supreme Court has refused to categorically answer “whether truthful
publication may ever be punished consistent with the First
Amendment.”8 Legal scholar Amy Gajda has written that deciding
where to draw the line between privacy rights and press freedom “is a
difficult task, but one that is absolutely necessary, both for the
protection of privacy and for the protection of First Amendment
freedoms.”9 Louis D. Brandeis is known as a Justice who provided
an intellectual foundation for privacy law in the United States10 and
6 See, e.g., Len Niehoff, Hulk Hogan v. Gawker: A Fight Between Privacy and Free
Speech, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar.16, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/len-niehoff/hulkhogan-gawker-lawsuit_b_9477556.html.
7 See, e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (acknowledging the
“tension between the right which the First Amendment accords to a free press, on the one
hand, and the protections which various statutes and common-law doctrines accord to
personal privacy against the publication of truthful information, on the other . . . ”); ERIN. K.
COYLE, THE PRESS & RIGHTS TO PRIVACY: FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS VS. INVASION OF
PRIVACY CLAIMS 23 (2012) (stating “the press’s First Amendment rights occasionally
conflict with privacy rights recognized by state common law and statutory torts that protect
individuals’ privacy interests against invasions by individuals or private entities.”).
8 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001).
9 AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN
A FREE PRESS 260 (2015).
10 See, e.g., Elbridge L. Adams, The Right of Privacy, And Its Relation to the Law of Libel,
39 AM. L. REV. 37, 37 (1905) (calling Warren and Brandeis’ article as “one of the most
brilliant excursions in the field of theoretical jurisprudence . . . ”); Randall P. Bezanson, The
Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CALIF. L.
REV. 1133, 1134 (1992) (stating that the article “presented the idea of privacy as it should be
understood”); Ruth Gavison, Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis were Right on
Privacy vs. Free Speech, 43 S.C. L. REV. 437, 438 (1992) (writing that “the article is
supposed to be the most influential law review article ever written, an essay that singlehandedly created a tort and an awareness of the need for legal remedies for invasions of
privacy. It is a classic, a pearl of common-law reasoning . . . ”); William L. Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383-85 (1960); Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy,
and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2010) (stating that two pieces written by
Brandeis “are the foundation of American privacy law.”); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L. J. 123, 125
(2007) (stating that “Warren and Brandeis did not invent the right to privacy from a
negligible body of precedent but instead charted a new path for American privacy law.”).
Cf. Jeffery A. Smith, Moral Guardians and the Origins of the Right to Privacy, 10
JOURNALISM & COMM. MONOGRAPHS 63 (2008) (arguing that multiple thought leaders had
called for privacy protection before the Harvard Law Review published the Warren and
Brandeis article).
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espoused the value of transparency.11 This article reviews Brandeis’
writings for guidance on how he would balance privacy rights and
public interests to receive truthful information on matters of public
significance in an ideal democratic state.
Brandeis is known for his co-authored 1890 Harvard Law
Review article that called for judges to create a branch of law that
presently provides individuals with means to sue for public exposure
of sensitive information about an individual.12 Yet, Brandeis is also
known for working with muckraking journalists to expose corporate
and political corruption, which was not in the best interest of our
democratic society.13 Brandeis wrote articles,14 letters,15 and court
opinions that presented freedom of expression and publicity as
powerful means to protect individuals against corruption and to
promote their participation in self-governance.16 His writings
introduced the concept, stating the need for judges to determine
whether invasions of privacy were reasonable.17 This concept has
allowed judges to balance privacy against other interests when

11 See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 389,
389 (2010); Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow “War”: FOIA, the Abuses of
Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 114344 (2007) [hereinafter Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight]; Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and
Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, U.
PENN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1991) [hereinafter Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters];
Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate
Governance at the End of History, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 109, 113-14 (2004).
12 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy]. See also Prosser, supra note
10, at 383-85 (stating that the “noted” article “has come to be regarded as the outstanding
example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American Law.”).
13 Erin K. Coyle, The Moral Duty of Publicity: Louis Dembitz Brandeis’ Crusades for
Reform in the Press and Public Affairs, 1890-1916, 35 JOURNALISM HISTORY 162, 163
(2009) [hereinafter Coyle, Duty of Publicity].
14 See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12; LOUIS D. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914) [hereinafter OTHER PEOPLE’S
MONEY].
15 See, e.g., Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Nov. 29, 1890), in 1
LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 94-95 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1971)
[hereinafter 1 LETTERS]; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1890),
in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 96; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb.
26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 100.
16 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
17 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 197; Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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determining whether invasions are unreasonable.18 This article
explores how the writings of Brandeis on privacy, publicity, and
participation in self-governance indicated the potential for individuals
to fully develop in a democratic society and thus influence the
balance of privacy interests.
Brandeis believed that an ideal democratic state must allow
individuals to reach their full human potential and assume civic
responsibilities.19 To reach that potential, people needed education,
opportunities to receive and discuss information relevant to potential
government policies, and freedom to participate in determining what
ideas could become laws or policies.20 Following a philosophy
common among progressives, Brandeis opposed bigness in
corporations and government.21 He favored competition among
corporate and government actors because he believed such
competition was more likely to help common individuals who were
not engaged in economic or political corruption.22 As an attorney,
U.S. Supreme Court Justice, and an advocate for reform, Brandeis’
focus on promoting self-fulfillment and self-governance in an ideal
democracy is apparent in his writings about seemingly incongruent
topics: protecting privacy against prying journalists and government
agents,23 protecting individuals from corporate and political
corruption,24 and protecting freedom to speak and participate in selfgovernment in a democratic society.25 This article aims to address
the question of how to balance individual privacy interests against
societal interests promoted by transparent government or corporate
activities by reviewing Brandeis’ correspondence, speeches,

18 See Slocum v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 542 So. 2d 777, 779 (La. Ct. App. 1989)
(explaining an example of a judge weighing privacy against other interests when determining
if it was an unreasonable invasion.).
19 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 39
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
20 Id. at 39-40.
21 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 21-22, 70
(1981) [hereinafter UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION].
22 Id. at 70.
23 See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12; see Olmstead, 27
U.S. at 473-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
24 See UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION , supra note 21, at
21-22, 70.
25 See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most Cited Law Review Articles of All
Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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published articles, and Supreme Court rulings that address privacy,26
the duty of publicity,27 political participation in a democracy,28 and
freedom of expression.29
II.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Brandeis is known for writing about privacy in a landmark
Harvard Law Review article,30 several letters,31 and a U.S. Supreme
Court ruling.32 Brandeis co-wrote “The Right to Privacy” in 1890
with Samuel Warren, Brandeis’ Harvard Law School classmate,
friend, and former law partner.33 Roscoe Pound indicated that
Brandeis and Warren added a chapter to the law as a result of that
article.34 More recently, commentators recognized “The Right to
Privacy” as one of the most cited law review articles of all time.35
The 1890 essay called upon judges to recognize a legal right to
privacy via common law tort that would protect individuals against
prying by members of the press, photographers, and gossips.36 The
essay called for courts to recognize a legal right to privacy that would
protect “what Judge Cooley calls the right to be ‘let alone’ ” via
common law precedent that could provide redress for psychological
harms that resulted from unconsented disclosures of images and
information related to individuals’ private lives.37

26 See Warren & Brandeis, Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 206; See Olmstead, 27 U.S.
at 473-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27 See Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 162.
28 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
29 Id.
30 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12.
31 See, e.g., Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Nov. 29, 1890), in 1
LETTERS, supra note 15, at 94-95; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec.
28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 97; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Samuel D.
Warren (April 8, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 303.
32 See Olmstead, 27 U.S. at 473-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33 Brandeis and Warren practiced together from 1879 to 1889 and when Warren’s father
died in 1889, Warren left the partnership to manage his family’s business. Dorothy J.
Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1979).
34 ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70, 650 (1956) (quoting a 1916
letter from Roscoe Pound to William Chilton) [hereinafter, MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE].
35 Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time,
110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012) (stating in 2012 that the Warren and Brandeis article
was the second most-cited law review article of all time).
36 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12 at 195-97.
37 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195-96, 198, 213.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2017], Art. 13

216

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

Brandeis and Warren published the essay during an era of
considerable change in the American population, technology, press,
culture, and social mobility.38 After the Civil War, urban areas grew
rapidly as people migrated from other countries and smaller towns.39
Advances in photography made it possible for images to be snapped
and sold without consent.40 Jacob Riis used flashlight to photograph
members of a growing working class who lived in crowded houses in
large cities.41 Telephone and telegraph lines also spread across urban
centers, allowing individuals and employees of the Penny Press to
quickly send news and information over distances.42 Details from
personal events, thus, spread via images, word-of-mouth, and news
stories.43
The Penny Press’ highly-circulated, inexpensive
newspapers produced detailed stories that addressed society events,
sports, crime, and matters of human interest to appeal to members of
the growing working and middle urban classes, spreading details that
elite classes did not want shared outside select social circles.44
Warren and Brandeis quoted E.L. Godkin’s criticism of the
inexpensive newspapers to support their call for privacy laws.45
Historians have described Godkin—who was an attorney, journalist,
and editor of The Nation—as an opinion leader and a distinguished

38 See, e.g., JOHN F. KASSON, RUDENESS & CIVILITY: MANNERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
URBAN AMERICA 71-79 (1990); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 (expanded ed. 2003).
39 See, e.g., KASSON, supra note 38, at 72; DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE
LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6-8 (1972).
40 See, e.g., Robert E. Mensel, “Kodakers Lying in Wait”: Amateur Photography and the
Right of Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 27-28 (1991).
41 See, e.g., JACOB A. RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES: STUDIES AMONG THE TENEMENTS
OF NEW YORK 9-18 (Luc Sante ed., Penguin Books 1997) (1890).
42 Joel
A. Tarr & Thomas Finholt, The City and the Telegraph: Urban
Telecommunications in the Pre-Telephone Era, 14 J. OF URB. HIST. 38 (1987); MICHAEL
SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 34-35
(1978).
43 See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195-96; 1870s1940s
–
Telephone,
IMAGINING
THE
INTERNET,
http://www.elon.edu/eweb/predictions/150/1870.xhtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2016).
44 See, e.g., ANDIE TUCHER, FROTH AND SCUM: TRUTH, BEAUTY, GOODNESS, AND THE AX
MURDER IN AMERICA’S FIRST MASS MEDIUM 2-3 (1994); TED CURTIS SMYTHE, THE GILDED
AGE PRESS, 1865-1900, 149 (2003); MARION TUTTLE MARZOLF, CIVILIZING VOICES:
AMERICAN PRESS CRITICISM, 1880-1950 7-8 (1991).
45 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 217 n.4 (citing E. L.
Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, SCRIBNER’S MAGAZINE, July 1890, at 58, 66 [hereinafter
Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen]).
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journalist.46 In a series of columns published prior to Warren and
Brandeis’ article, Godkin criticized inexpensive newspapers and
gossips for harming the dignity of persons and societal standards for
morality by spreading details about personal lives.47 Godkin blamed
newspapers for causing greater harm than gossips because the
widespread publication of sensitive information “inflict[ed] what
[wa]s, to many men, the great pain of believing that everybody he
meets in the street is perfectly familiar with some folly, or
misfortune, or indiscretion, or weakness . . . . ”48 Godkin argued that
Americans needed some instrument, such as a law, to chill the wide
circulation of such personal information.49 Warren and Brandeis
acknowledged that call for a remedy to protect individuals from “the
evil of the invasion of privacy by the newspapers.”50
Newspapers addressed those who attended high-society
weddings and parties in cities, such as Boston.51 Scholarship has
suggested that Warren and Brandeis were inspired to write their
essay, partly by newspaper coverage of the Warren family’s personal
lives and events.52 Since Warren married Mabel Bayard, who was
the daughter of a U.S. Senator and former candidate for President,
newspapers published details about his wedding and his family’s

46 See, e.g., FRANK LUTHER MOTT, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MAGAZINES: 1865-1885 22
(1967); EDWIN LAWRENCE GODKIN, PROBLEMS OF MODERN DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ESSAYS vi-xii (Morton Keller ed., Belknap Press 1966) (1896); Erin K. Coyle, E.
L. Godkin’s Criticism of the Penny Press: Antecedents to a Legal Right to Privacy, 31 AM.
JOURNALISM 262, 262-67 (2014) [hereinafter Coyle, E.L. Godkin’s Criticism of the Penny
Press].
47 Coyle, E.L. Godkin’s Criticism of the Penny Press, supra note 46, at 262-72; Godkin,
The Rights of the Citizen, supra note 45, at 66; E. L. Godkin, Cheap Newspapers, THE
NATION, May 1, 1890, at 346; E. L. Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, AM. SOC. SCI.
ASS’N, Dec. 1880, at 79-83; E. L. Godkin, The Law of Libel, THE NATION, Feb. 28, 1889, at
173.
48 Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, supra note 45, at 66.
49 Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, supra note 45, at 67.
50 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195.
51 PEMBER, supra note 39, at 23-24 (stating that “[t]he Warren-Brandeis proposal was
essentially a rich man’s plea to the press to stop its gossiping and snooping . . . . ”).
52 See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 10, at 383 (explaining that Warren married the daughter of
Senator Bayard of Delaware, and she was among Boston’s social elite). He wrote that
Boston newspapers “covered her parties in highly personal and embarrassing detail” during
the era of yellow journalism, “when the press had begun to resort to excesses in the way of
prying . . . . ” Prosser, supra note 10, at 383.
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subsequent social affairs.53 In The Right to Privacy, Warren and
Brandeis wrote:
The press is overstepping in every direction the
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip
is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious,
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry
as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the
columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent,
column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which
can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic
circle. The intensity and complexity of life, attendant
upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary
some retreat from the world, and man, under the
refining influence of culture, has become more
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have
become more essential to the individual; but modern
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon
his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress,
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily
injury.54
In a letter to Warren, Brandeis indicated that they wrote the article at
Warren’s suggestion and because of Warren’s “deepseated
abhorrence of the invasions of social privacy . . . . ”55
Warren and Brandeis described a right to privacy deserving of
legal protection as a right related to one’s control over whether and
how his thoughts and sentiments are publicized.56 They argued that
protection afforded to individuals to determine whether their ideas,
thoughts, or words were publicized related to a right to be let alone.57
The principle protecting personal writings was “that of an inviolate
personality.”58 Warren and Brandeis added:
53

See, e.g., Amy Gajda, What if Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a Senator’s
Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage that Led to “The Right to Privacy,” 2008 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 35 (2008).
54 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.
55 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Samuel D. Warren (April 8, 1905), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 15, at 303.
56 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 198.
57 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 204-05.
58 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 205.
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If we are correct in this conclusion, the existing law
affords a principle which may be invoked to protect
the privacy of the individual from invasion either by
the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the
possessor of any other modern device for recording or
reproducing scenes or sounds. . . . If, then, the
decisions indicate a general right to privacy for
thoughts, emotions, and sensations, these should
receive the same protection, whether expressed in
writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or
in facial expression.59
Thus, a right to privacy could be recognized as part of a “more
general right to the immunity of the person, —the right to one’s
personality.”60
The Right to Privacy suggested that individuals have a right to
control whether and how their thoughts, ideas, and sentiments are
conveyed to others, and that right of control was threatened by
modern inventions, such as portable cameras and sound recordings,
and by journalists or gossips who publicized details for individuals’
personal lives.61 Warren and Brandeis grounded the legal right to
privacy in the right to an inviolate personality, which protected
“individual demands.”62 They wrote: “The principle which protects
personal writings and any other productions of the intellect or of the
emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law has no new principle to
formulate when it extends this protection to the personal appearance,
sayings, acts, and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise.”63
In addition to recognizing that individuals endured emotional
harm when gossip and news intruded upon the personal sphere, or
domestic life, Warren and Brandeis argued that circulating those
details harmed society.64 They wrote:
Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested,
becomes the seed of more, and, in direct proportion to
its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards

59
60
61
62
63
64

Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 206.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 207.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 211.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 213.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.
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and of morality. Even gossip apparently harmless,
when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for
evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by
inverting the relative importance of things, thus
dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people.65
The essay argued that those details detracted from individuals’
learning and thinking about “matters of real interest to the
community,” thus the spread of gossip and sensational news had a
“blighting influence” on society.66 The right to privacy, then, would
afford legal remedies against severe emotional harms that deterred
individuals from participating in an ideal democratic state and
distracted others from focusing on matters of importance in an ideal
democratic state.67
Warren and Brandeis identified broad limitations for the right
to privacy that allowed for judges to determine when invasions were
unreasonable.68 First, a judge could not consider a publication of
general interest or public interest an invasion of privacy. 69 The essay
distinguished between privacy interests for persons who have sought
public attention, or notoriety, and those who have not. Warren and
Brandeis wrote:
In general, then, the matters of which the
publication should be repressed may be described as
those which concern the private life, habits, acts, and
relations of an individual, and have no legitimate
connection with his fitness for a public office which
he seeks or for which he is suggested, or for any
public or quasi public position which he seeks or for
which he is suggested, and have no legitimate relation
to or bearing upon any act done by him in a public or
quasi public capacity.70
65

Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.
67 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.
68 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 214-19.
69 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 214-15 (“The design of the
law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate
concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all
persons, whatsoever; their position or station, from having matters which they may properly
prefer to keep private, made public against their will.”).
70 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216.
66
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For instance, Warren and Brandeis wrote that “[p]eculiarities of
manner and person” may be considered matters of public import
regarding a candidate for public office.71 On the other hand,
publicizing that a common person had a speech impediment would
not be considered a matter of public importance.72
Warren and Brandeis stated that the law of privacy would
adopt privileges for communications recognized by defamation law,
with the exception of the privilege for publishing truth.73 First,
privacy law would not prohibit communication made in a court,
legislative body, or other government body or quasi-public body.74
Second, invasions of privacy would only apply to oral
communications made with special damages, following restrictions
applied for slander.75 As malice was not necessary to prove in most
defamation claims, invasion of privacy would not require proving
publicity was provided with ill will.76 Unlike the laws for libel and
slander, however, privacy law would address harms caused by
publishing either true or false information.77
Since Warren and Brandeis’ recognition also drew upon
rationales for copyright protection of personal writing,78 their
recognition of limitations for privacy rights also related to limitations
for intellectual property rights.79 They reasoned that the right to
privacy was not invaded by an individual’s own publication of
information or by publication with an individual’s consent.80
Publicizing such information without consent would harm the
principle of inviolate personality. 81 As such, compelling publication
without permission would harm personal autonomy related to how to
present one’s self to others, which would revoke solitude and privacy
that would be “more essential” due to modern enterprises and
“advancing civilization.”82
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 215.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 215.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216-18.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216-17.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 217.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 218-19.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 218.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 198.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 218.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 218.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 205.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.
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Brandeis addressed the privacy article in two letters to Alice
Goldmark, whom he was courting, in 1890.83 The first stated that he
received the proofs, and what he read “did not strike [him] as being
as good as [he] thought it was.”84 The second indicated that he and
Warren hoped the essay would help shape public opinion regarding
invasions of privacy.85 They wanted to convince people that such
invasions are not necessary.86 They also wanted to “make [people]
ashamed of the pleasure they take in subjecting themselves to such
invasions.”87 Brandeis indicated that law would not be effective
unless public opinion supported the premise for the law.88
Several weeks later, Brandeis addressed privacy again in a
letter to James Bettner Ludlow,89 a New York attorney involved in an
unsuccessful invasion of privacy appeal the New York Court of
Appeals considered in 1895.90 In that case, New York’s highest court
did not recognize a right to privacy was violated during the use of a
deceased woman’s image to sculpt a statue in 1895.91 A decade later,
Brandeis informed Ludlow that Georgia’s highest court recognized a
legal right to privacy in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Co.92 The Pavesich court concluded that a man’s right to privacy was
violated by an advertisement that used his image without his
permission.93 Brandeis wrote, “You will, I know, be pleased, as I am,
to find that the right to [p]rivacy is at last finding judicial

83 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Nov. 29, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 94-95; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1980), in 1
LETTERS, supra note 15, at 97.
84 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Nov. 29, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 95.
85 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1980), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 97.
86 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1980), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 97.
87 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1980), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 97.
88 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 22, 1980), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 97.
89 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James Bettner Ludlow (April 20, 1905), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 15, at 306.
90 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James Bettner Ludlow (April 20, 1905), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 15, at 306; Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 22-23 (N.Y. 1895).
91 Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 28-29 (N.Y. 1895).
92 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
93 Id. at 73-74.
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recognition.”94 Brandeis added that he received a letter from Judge
Andrew Cobb, who wrote the majority opinion in Pavesich.95 That
letter indicated the right to privacy “would before long become the
established doctrine of our law.”96
In 1905, Brandeis also wrote about The Right to Privacy again
in a personal letter to Samuel D. Warren, in which Brandeis pointed
Warren’s attention to an American Law Review article that cited The
Right to Privacy.97 In the letter, Brandeis wrote to Warren stating
that the citation of The Right to Privacy demonstrated that their
article “remain[ed] a vital force.”98 Warren encouraged Brandeis to
draft legislation to address invasions of privacy.99 However,
Brandeis did not write a privacy statute.100
More than two decades passed before Brandeis publicly
addressed privacy in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,101
which included some key phrases also included in The Right to
Privacy.102 The majority opinion in Olmstead held that federal
prohibition officers did not violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights of Olmstead and his associates when the officers recorded
Olmstead’s telephone conversations.103 The men were accused of
violating the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing,

94 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James Bettner Ludlow (April 20, 1905), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 15, at 306.
95 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James Bettner Ludlow (April 20, 1905), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 15, at 306.
96 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James Bettner Ludlow (April 20, 1905), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 15, at 306.
97 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Samuel D. Warren (Apr. 8, 1905), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 15, at 302.
98 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Samuel D. Warren (Apr. 8, 1905), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 15, at 302.
99 Letter from Samuel D. Warren to Louis D. Brandeis (Apr. 20, 1905), quoted in 1
LETTERS, supra note 15, at 303; Richards, supra note 10, at 1310-11.
100 Richards, supra note 10, at 1310-11.
101 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
102 Id. at 473-78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining that as society continues to make
advances in discoveries and technologies, it is inevitable that the government will have more
efficient means available to them to invade one’s privacy, making it necessary to protect
against any invasions of “the sanctities of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” (quoting
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
103 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466-69 (holding that wire-tapping did not amount to a search
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that the common law rule
which allowed for illegally obtained evidence to be admissible in court was applicable in this
case).
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transporting, and selling liquors.104
Brandeis countered that
government agents violated the law in the state of Washington where
they recorded telephone conversations without the knowledge or
consent of Olmstead and his associates, thus their actions invaded the
privacy of Olmstead and his associates.105
Brandeis wrote:
“Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government,
by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet,”106 as advances
in technology and journalistic prying made it possible that personal
information whispered in the closet in 1890 could be shared with
broader audiences.107 Brandeis’ Olmstead dissent described the
wiretapping performed by the government agents as an instrument of
“tyranny and oppression.”108
Scholarship has considered Brandeis’ Olmstead dissent
significant because it provided a foundation for modern conceptions
of Fourth Amendment law109 and the constitutional right to privacy110
that legal scholar Neil Richards calls “intellectual privacy.”111 That
opinion reiterated the value of emotions and sensations that may be
harmed by unreasonable invasions of privacy.112 Brandeis wrote:

104

Id. at 455.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 n.13 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing a lengthy list of state
statutory compilations which have made it a criminal offense to intercept, disclose or divulge
without consent, or willfully interfere with the transmissions of any message made through
the telegram or telephone).
106 Id. at 473.
107 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195.
108 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
109 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 645
(2007); Richards, supra note 10, at 1296 (explaining how Brandeis was able to “introduce[]
modern concepts of privacy into constitutional law,” which had a major influence on the
Supreme Court’s decision to recognize a constitutional right to privacy and change its
perspective on Fourth Amendment law).
110 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152 (1973) (holding that even though the Constitution does
not explicitly grant the right to privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized this
“fundamental” right through its historic application of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 48696 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Although the Constitution does not speak in so many words
of the right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe that it offers these fundamental rights no
protection.”); Richards, supra note 10, at 1296.
111 Richards, supra note 10, at 1298; NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY:
RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 95 (2015) (describing intellectual privacy
as “a zone of protection that guards our ability to make up our minds freely.”).
112 Olmstead, 277 U.S.at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
105
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The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature,
of his feelings, and of his intellect. They knew that
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone--the
most comprehensive of rights, and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal
proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must
be deemed a violation of the Fifth [Amendment].113
Addressing the facts in Olmstead, Brandeis indicated that
wiretapping was a particularly invasive action because it recorded not
only the conversations of someone suspected of committing a crime,
but also recorded the conversations the suspected person had with
other people.114 That act encroached upon the liberty of individuals
not suspected of criminal activity.115
Brandeis recognized a
constitutional right to privacy that would protect individuals’
information from such unwarranted collection of personal
information by government actors.116
Brandeis’ writings, accordingly, indicated that the
Constitution and common law ought to protect individuals against
unreasonable invasions of privacy that undermined his vision for a
democratic state.117 Invasions were considered unreasonable when
they harmed individuals’ sensations and emotions in a manner that
exposed private persons to scrutiny otherwise reserved for voluntary
participants in public life, such as political office holders.118
Invasions were also considered unreasonable when government
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id.
Id. at 475-76.
Id.
Id. at 478-79.
Id.; Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195-97.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216.
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agents acted in manners that could diminish individuals’ trust in the
democratic system of laws.119
III.

DUTY OF PUBLICITY

Although publicity seemed to be a foe to privacy interests,
Brandeis presented privacy and publicity as essential for an ideal
democracy. Through his work as the people’s attorney and a
publicist, Brandeis also strove to protect individuals’ independence
against powerful political or government actors.120 In those crusades,
he used publicity as a means to protect individuals against
exploitation that could potentially stunt their self-fulfillment,121 and
as a means to enable individuals to contribute to democracy.122
Commentators have noted Brandeis’ assertion that sunlight disinfects
people’s actions,123 particularly when addressing his advocacy related
to economic legislation and corporate activities.124 This section
reviews some of Brandeis’ writings related to publicity as a means to
promote good government and individual participation in democracy.
Brandeis wrote about the duty of publicity in a letter
indicating that he wished to write somewhat of a companion piece to
The Right to Privacy called The Duty of Publicity.125 He proposed
that sunlight could expose wrongdoing, preventing people from
pretending to be honest or associating with honest people when they
are actually encouraging “wickedness” in secrecy. 126 He continued,
“If the broad light of day could be let in upon men’s actions, it would

119

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471-72, 484-85.
See, e.g., ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE 32-39 (1936)
[hereinafter MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE]; LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE
OF BIGNESS (1935).
121 See, e.g., MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 33-38.
122 See, e.g., LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Robert W. Bruere, in
THE CURSE OF BIGNESS, at 270-71 [hereinafter BRANDEIS, CURSE OF BIGNESS].
123 See, e.g., Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 162; ETZIONI, supra note 11, at
389; Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight, supra note 11, at 1144; Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and
Scarlet Letters supra note 11, at 6-7; Winkler, supra note 11, at 113-14.
124 See, e.g., Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 162; Winkler, supra note 11, at
113-14.
125 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 100.
126 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 100.
120
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purify them as the sun disinfects.”127 Although he did not write that
article,128 he subsequently addressed the duty for publicity to keep
government and corporate corruption in check in letters, magazine
articles, and speeches.129
Throughout the late nineteenth century and into the first
decade of the twentieth century, Brandeis used publicity to shine a
proverbial spotlight on inefficiency, bribery, and corruption in the
Boston government.130
In 1903, he helped form The Good
Government Association, which focused on government in Boston.131
A year later, he helped form the Public Franchise League, which
focused more broadly on people’s interests in public utilities and the
government in Massachusetts.132 Brandeis called upon citizens and
business leaders to push for more efficient and less corrupt
government that would favor public interests rather than political
interests.133
In a March 1903 speech delivered before the Boot and Shoe
Club, Brandeis publicly criticized Boston officials for corruption.134
He stated that public funds paid for work that was never
completed.135 He also indicated that a member of the common
council had resigned after he was charged with attempting to defraud
the United States, and “there was an open vista of election frauds and
corruption far surpassing anything ever known in this city” in
1903.136 The Boston Herald summarized Brandeis’ argument, stating
that publicity was “the foe of corrupt politics” and was the instrument
127

Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 100.
128 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE supra note 34, at 94.
129 See, e.g., BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at
263-65; MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 32-39; Louis D.
Brandeis, Speech before the Good Government Association (Dec. 11, 1903) (transcript
available in the Louis D. Brandeis School Of Law Library) [hereinafter Brandeis, Speech
before Good Government Association].
130 BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at 263-65.
131 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 118.
132 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 118, 127, 129.
133 BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at 263-65
134 Rich Men to Blame, BOSTON HERALD, March 19, 1903, at 1.
135 Id. (referring to a letter sent to Boston Newspapers, which indicated that Brandeis had
not written down the speech made before the Boot & Shoe Club, and as such the newspaper
incorrectly reports that he criticized work by clerks in the city’s financial departments);
Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to the Editors of the Boston Newspapers (Mar. 24, 1903), in 1
LETTERS, supra note 15, at 228-29.
136 Rich Men to Blame, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 19, 1903, at 1.
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that would inform citizens about municipal affairs.137 Brandeis urged
members of the business community to take greater interest in the
local government.138 A second published transcript of the speech
indicated Brandeis stated that the opinions of the general public in
Boston are sensitive, making their opinions capable of causing
reforms when “intelligently directed” against corruption in any
government department.139 He stated that Boston needed citizens to
organize and seek competent government by revealing
misgovernment: “The light of truth and honesty and honor will be
shed in all the nooks and corners of our political system of Boston,
and the corrupt politicians will be forced into darkness.”140 Brandeis
proposed that providing citizens with information about
misgovernment would empower citizens to call for reforms.141
Less than a month later, Brandeis stated that misgovernment
in Boston had reached the “danger point.”142 Brandeis praised then
Mayor Patrick Andrew Collins for informing the public about a new
investigation of how the city spent public money over the past
decade.143 Brandeis stated, “At such a time, it behooves us to look
about carefully and determine where danger lies, and where there is
safety.”144 He offered Collins’ work to reveal financial records,
which demonstrated an example of good government, showing that
the records were of “of inestimable value.”145 Brandeis indicated that
Collins’ report struck at the cause of past misgovernment by
providing citizens with access to information about how public
employees performed government business.146 The Boston Herald’s
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
Id.
BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at 264.
BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at 264.
BRANDEIS, Address on Corruption, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120, at 265.
City Hall Corruption, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 9, 1903, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The newspaper’s coverage of his speech and Collins’ report continued:
The reason the people are indifferent is because they are ignorant of the
facts—ignorant of the specific acts of misgovernment—ignorant of the
low character or quality of many of the men by whom in public life they
are misrepresented. No one can grow enthusiastic over virtue in general
or become indignant over evil in general. It is the particular virtuous or
vicious act in all its details which receives our admiration or excites our
condemnation. Not a man here who as a thinking and feeling human
being can look into the details of our city’s administration and be
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coverage of Brandeis’ speech explored the difference between
governors who operated with secrecy and good governors who made
information available to the public.147 The newspaper summarized
Brandeis’ assertions that people should be able to learn information
about government, stating that learning about misgovernment would
inspire indignation and shame.148 Those feelings needed to be
“followed by remedial action” to replace misgovernment with a
government that served citizens’ interests.149 Citizens, however, had
difficulties learning about how government officials conducted the
city’s business because its Board of Alderman established a
Committee on Public Improvement that met and voted in closed
sessions, allowing the Alderman Committee to keep the
government’s activities secret.150
The week of the December 1903 elections, Brandeis made a
more direct appeal for citizens to change who was representing them
in Boston.151 Brandeis urged members of the Good Government
Association not to support James Michael Curley, a local politician
Brandeis said was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the government
of the United States.152 In 1902, Thomas F. Curley and James
Michael Curley pretended to be other men when they attempted to
answer civil service examination questions.153 In a speech, Brandeis
stated:
The waste and theft of public monies which result
from having such men in office is bad enough, but a
hundred times worse is the demoralization of our
people which results . . . [s]hall we permit these, our
fellow citizens—perhaps our future rulers—to be
indifferent. He will be at times filled with admiration by the excellent
work done by some men—and at other times roused to indignation—
overcome by shame that the offices of a great people are prostituted by
his own representatives to their contemptible and corrupt ends.
City Hall Corruption, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 9, 1903, at 2.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 121.
151 Brandeis, Speech before Good Government Association, supra note 129.
152 Brandeis, Speech before Good Government Association, supra note 129 (“Nothing
breeds faster than corruption. Every criminal in the public service is a plague spot spreading
contagion on every hand. Think what a heritage we shall leave to our children if corruption
is allowed to stalk about unstayed [sic.].”
153 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 227 n.4.
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taught that in Boston liberty means license to loot the
public treasury—that in Boston opportunity means the
chance for graft.154
Despite Brandeis calling upon “men of honor” to vote against Curley
and other criminals, and thus protect Boston from future corruption,
Curley won reelection.155 Four of the nine candidates that the Good
Government Association endorsed were not elected in 1903.156
Thereafter, Brandeis responded with plans for the association to
systematically use more publicity for its candidates to win elections
the following year.157
Brandeis again addressed the importance of an informed
citizenry when he spoke before the Public School Association in
1904.158 He called upon citizens to cast their votes for “men and
women who are scrupulously honest,” “absolutely disinterested,” and
“efficient.”159 He contrasted those characteristics with those of
Bostonians who sought public jobs for themselves and their friends
“by corrupt means to obtain from public officers corrupt contracts to
enrich themselves.”160 He chided people who were uninformed or
who rationalized not voting on the premise that they would not
support “machine politicians;” he identified their responsibility for
the bad government that resulted from a lack of votes for candidates
who would serve the public interest.161 Brandeis stated, “Democracy
means that the people shall govern, and they can govern only by
taking the trouble to inform themselves as to the facts necessary for a
correct decision, and then by recording that decision through a public

154

Brandeis, Speech before Good Government Association, supra note 129.
Id. Curley went on to serve as the mayor of Boston, governor of Massachusetts, and a
U.S.
congressman.
James
Michael
Curley,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-Michael-Curley (last visited Sept. 17, 2016).
156 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Edmund Billings (Dec. 16, 1903), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 15, at 240 n.2.
157 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Edmund Billings (Dec. 16, 1903), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 15, at 238-40. He suggested that Edmund Billings, secretary of the association,
systematically start contacting more associations and arranging for speakers to address good
government during at least one hundred meetings. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Edmund
Billings (Dec. 16, 1903), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 239.
158 Louis D. Brandeis, Speech before the Public School Association (Dec. 2, 1904.)
(transcript available in the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law Library).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
155
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vote.”162 In a democracy, then, publicity must provide citizens with
information, and citizens must seek that information to educate
themselves regarding the administration of government; otherwise,
governors could act in secrecy against the public’s interest.163
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, muckrakers and members
of the Progressive Movement used publicity to expose abuses to the
general public in the hope that the public would call for
accountability and reform.164
At that time, members of the
Progressive Movement referred to publicity as a type of “broad
searchlight for exposing [corporate] excess and [political] corruption
. . . .”165 As a progressive, Brandeis corresponded with leading
muckraking journalists, editors, and publishers during the twentieth
century.166 Muckraking magazines published more than a dozen of
Brandeis’ articles that addressed abuse of power during the
Progressive era.167 Communication scholars, Kevin Stoker and Brad
Rawlins, wrote that muckraking journalists and social activists saw
publicity as a “ ‘righteous weapon for fighting social ills . . . .’ ”168
Stoker and Rawlins described “the progressive[’s] definition of
publicity as something with the intrinsic value of correcting corporate
wrongdoing.”169 Brandeis also used the term in that manner.170
As progressives used publicity in their pursuit of political
freedom and economic independence, Brandeis used publicity as he
sought to protect citizens’ interests against government employees’
misdirected loyalties that could enrich politicians and corporations at
the expense of the public.171 For instance, Brandeis represented an
Interior Department employee in a Congressional investigation
examining reports made by the Taft administration, which stated that
corporations gained access to coal filings and land in Alaska by

162

Id.
See MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 121.
164 Kevin Stoker& Brad Rawlins, The “Light” of Publicity in the Progressive Era: From
Searchlight
to
Flashlight,
30
JOURNALISM
HIST.
177,
177
(2005)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273439997_The_Light_of_Publicity_in_the_Progr
essive_Era_From_Searchlight_to_Flashlight.
165 Stoker & Rawlins, supra note 164, at 177.
166 Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 163.
167 Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 164.
168 Stoker & Rawlins, supra note 164, at 178.
169 Stoker & Rawlins, supra note 164, at 177.
170 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 92.
171 See, e.g., Brandeis, Speech before Good Government Association, supra note 129.
163

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2017], Art. 13

232

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

having an individual obtain the land on their behalf.172 Brandeis’
investigation revealed that Louis Glavis reported the conspiracy to
then Secretary of the Interior, Richard A. Ballinger, who also
previously worked as an attorney for some of the applicants for tracts
of the land.173 Some of the lands were also under the jurisdiction of
the Chief Forester, Gifford Pinchot, who reported the potential
conspiracy to President William Howard Taft.174 Glavis also reported
what had occurred to Taft, who sent Glavis’ report to Ballinger.175
The Secretary of the Interior then sent Taft a report for Taft to sign.176
The report, which Taft signed, praised Ballinger and directed
Ballinger to dismiss Glavis.177 When another employee testified that
Ballinger—not Taft—had written that report, the investigation
revealed duplicity.178
Following the Progressive tradition, Brandeis focused on
informing citizens about official wrongdoing as he investigated the
actions of Ballinger and Glavis.179 Brandeis called for Ballinger to be
held accountable for wrongdoing, and he sent copies of his arguments
defending Glavis to members of the press.180 Brandeis argued that
Glavis should not be punished for insubordination in a society
endangered by employees who are “of too complacent obedience to
the will of superiors” and forget their obligation to serve the public.181
172

MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 46.
MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 46.
174 MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 173, at 46-47.
175 MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 46-47.
176 MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 47.
177 M MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE, supra note 120, at 47.
178 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at 57-61.
179 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at 60.
180 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at 59-60.
181 Louis D. Brandeis, Opening Argument at the Joint Committee to Investigate the
Interior Department and Forestry Service (May 27, 1910) (transcript available in the Louis
D. Brandeis School Of Law Library) [hereinafter Brandeis, Opening Argument]. Brandeis
suggested that Ballinger had misperceived what type of loyalty is desired in a democracy.
Brandeis wrote:
The loyalty that you want is loyalty to the real employer, to the people of
the United States. This idea that loyalty to an immediate superior is
something commendable when it goes to a forgetfulness of one’s country
involves a strange misconception of our Government and a strange
misconception of what democracy is. It is a revival—a relic of the Slave
status, a relic of the time when “the king could do no wrong,” and when
everybody owed allegiance to the king. The people to whom our
officials owe allegiance are the people of the United States, and every
man in it who is paid by the people of the United States and who takes the
173
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He stated that Americans needed public employees to think about
their responsibility to citizens—not only to their superiors.182 He
stated: “We are not dealing here with a question of the conservation
of natural resources merely; it is the conservation and development of
the individual; it is the conservation of democracy; it is the
conservation of manhood. That is what this fight into which Glavis
entered most unwillingly means.”183 Brandeis praised Glavis and a
second employee for disclosing the acts of superiors.184 Glavis and a
second employee exposed wrongdoing to sunlight rather than
allowing such actions to be hidden in the shadows.185
Brandeis also used publicity as a tool for reform when he
sought to protect common people against the turmoil he believed
would ultimately result from concentrated economic power.186 He
encouraged economic competition because he recognized that
concentrated economic power, as well as concentrated political
power, could cause social turmoil that would hinder individuals’
freedom to enjoy life in an ideal democratic state.187 His article,
What Publicity Can Do, stated: “Publicity is justly commended as a
remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” 188
Scholars subsequently have cited those opening lines from Brandeis’

oath of office owes that allegiance to the people of the United States and to
none other. These men who stand by the Secretary with a sort of
personal fidelity and friendliness are actually disloyal. They may claim
that they are not insubordinate to him; but they are insubordinate to the
people of the United States.
Brandeis, Opening Argument, supra note 181.
182 Brandeis, Opening Argument, supra note 181.
183 Brandeis, Opening Argument, supra note 181.
184 Brandeis, Opening Argument, supra note 181.
185 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at 60. Ballinger
resigned in 1911. UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at
61.
186 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 104-05 (“Brandeis saw democracy
fatally threatened by the ‘excesses’ of capitalism, by ‘its own acts of injustice.’ ”).
187 UROFSKY, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION, supra note 21, at 70 (stating
that “Reason and morality imposed limits on the competitive struggle. Brandeis also held
that political democracy depended upon economic democracy;” MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE,
supra note 34, at 104 (explaining that Brandeis believed that “social turmoil, as he saw it,
was but the natural, inevitable byproduct of a changing order, of the shift of power from the
few to the many.”).
188 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 92.
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article as support for transparency in business and government.189
That article was part of a series of Brandeis’ articles, published in
Harper’s Weekly in 1913 and 1914, that addressed the concentration
of power of investment bankers and the consolidation of banks and
railroads. 190 Those articles presented economic risks that Brandeis
associated with concentrations of wealth and financial power and his
proposals for legislative and economic reforms. 191 What Publicity
Can Do described publicity as a “potent force” and “in many ways as
a continuous remedial measure.”192 By publishing articles on
excesses and speaking about reforms at meetings, Brandeis used
publicity as a means to make the public aware of entities that had
grown powerful enough for select people to gain financial benefits
without necessarily providing common people with benefits that
Brandeis sought for all citizens.193
Brandeis demonstrated that publicity could serve as a tool to
promote reform.194 He stated that the law was starting to require
publicity as a measure to protect the public’s interest in fair
competition.195 He indicated that The Federal Pure Food Law helped
citizens make decisions about food quality because the law required
manufacturers to disclose ingredients, shining a metaphorical
flashlight on food products.196 He suggested that the public needed to
similarly require banks to inform investors about the values of
securities and how much bankers earned by marketing and selling the
securities.197 Brandeis identified the wealth of investment bankers as
a problem that limited the potential for common people to gain “New
Freedom.”198 He indicated that individual investors contributed to
that wealth partly due to ignorance regarding the benefits bankers
189 See, e.g., Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight, supra note 11, at 1144; Kreimer, Sunlight,
Secrets, and Scarlet Letters, supra note 11, at 6-7; Winkler, supra note 11, at 113-14.
190 See Norman Hapgood, Preface to BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14,
at xiv.
191 Norman Hapgood, Preface to BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at
xiii.
192 Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 92.
193 BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14.
194 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 92.
195 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 98.
196 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 10304.
197 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 10103.
198 BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 97.
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received when individuals invested in securities.199 He called for
bankers to disclose to investors the commissions and profits the
bankers received from selling stocks or bonds, as well as how the
bankers’ financial benefits were influenced by the riskiness of
securities for investors.200 He wrote, “To be effective, knowledge of
the facts must be actually brought home to the investor, and this can
best be done by requiring the facts to be stated in good, large type in
every notice, circular, letter and advertisement inviting the investor to
purchase.”201
Brandeis proposed that banks, railroads, public
services, and industrial corporations should be subjects of publicity,
so that their actions would be subjected to the force of public
opinion.202
Brandeis’ essay, True Americanism, connected his themes on
the need for education and information regarding government and
economics to the rights for individuals to enjoy liberty and freedom
in a democracy.203 Brandeis stated that American ideals “are the
development of the individual for his own and the common good—
the development of the individual through liberty and the attainment
of the common good through democracy and social justice.”204 He
added that the American “form of government, as well as our
humanity, compels us to strive for the development of the individual
man.”205 Brandeis related the ideal for individuals to exercise the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution to “liberty, freedom in things
industrial as well as political,” and “the full development and
utilization of one’s faculties.”206 He wrote that democracy depended
upon equal opportunities for all individuals to develop and advance
199
200

BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 99.
BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 101-

03.
BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 104.
BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at 93,
99, 103.
203 Louis D. Brandeis, True Americanism, HARPER’S WEEKLY, July 10, 1915, at 31-32.
THE CURSE OF BIGNESS identified this piece as a speech that Brandeis delivered at Faneuil
Hall in Boston, on July 4, 1915. BRANDEIS, List of Addresses, in CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra
note 120, at 271.
204 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 31.
205 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 31.
206 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 31. (explaining that individuals needed
education initially through formal schooling and later through discussions or reading, for
“freshness of mind” it is necessary that work conditions allow individuals to enjoy freedom
from oppressive industrial power during work hours and enjoy time off for leisure activities,
and also have “some degree of financial independence.”).
201
202
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civilization.207 Each person’s exercise of individual rights in the
twentieth century democracy, thus, was limited when the exercise
“interfere[d] with the exercise of a like right by all others.”208
Thus, in a democracy, Brandeis identified a duty for the
209
press.
He hoped for people to use publicity to provide the public
with information that would help individuals develop and advance
the common good, particularly when publicity served as a tool for
social justice by piercing the veils of secrecy that prevented the
public from discovering practices that helped powerful entities and
did not help the general public.210 Publicity also served as a valuable
tool for exposing other people’s actions that would hinder an
individual’s development or harm the common good.211 But
exercising freedom of expression for publicity, as is true for the
exercise of other rights, necessarily must be limited when the
exercise would hinder individual liberty or the common good for
society.212
IV.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY

Brandeis believed that laws needed to keep pace with
contemporary standards in a democratic society.213 In 1916, he wrote
that the American ideal of government had changed from “A
government of laws and not of men” to a government that promotes
“[d]emocracy and social justice.”214 An ideal democracy provided
people with the freedom and opportunities to develop fully as
207

Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32.
Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32.
209 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Edwin Munroe Bacon (Aug. 6, 1890), paraphrased
in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 90. Urofsky and Levy paraphrased that letter as stating
“Americans put up with many abuses less from indifference than from forgetfulness.
Today’s wrong is forgotten quickly by people involved with their jobs and interests. A
reform-minded press must not only point out new evils, but remind people of old ills, so they
will not be forgotten.” Id.
210 Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 163.
211 Coyle, Duty of Publicity, supra note 13, at 163.
212 See Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32 (“Each man may develop
himself so far, but only so far, as his doing so will not interfere with the exercise of a like
right by all others. Thus liberty came to mean the right to enjoy life, to acquire property, to
pursue happiness in such manner and to such extent only as the exercise of the right in each
is consistent with the exercise of a like right by every other of our fellow citizens. Liberty
thus defined underlies twentieth century democracy.”).
213 Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Feb. 19, 1916, at 173.
214 Id.
208
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individuals and help promote the well being of society.215
Democracy also allowed for government to limit individual exercises
of expression and other rights, when such exercises harmed another
person’s liberty—the rights to enjoy life, acquire property, and
pursue happiness.216 Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Whitney
suggests that freedom of expression “is essential” to democracy and,
thus, trivial harm to personal liberties cannot justify a restriction on
freedom of expression.217 Neil Richards has suggested that Brandeis
changed his mind about the exercise of freedom of expression in a
democratic society after he joined the U.S. Supreme Court, and that
shift might have affected how to logically balance privacy and free
expression rights.218 Thus, this section reviews opinions, in which
Brandeis addressed freedom of expression or privacy, to address how
he perceived those interests during the twentieth century.
The American federal government grew bigger during World
War I, as Congress sought to protect the nation by passing
legislation.219 Brandeis primarily voted with the rest of the U.S.
Supreme Court to uphold that legislation.220 Congress passed several
statutes that restricted free speech.221 Brandeis initially voted with
the majority in support of the federal government’s application of two
of those statutes in Schenck v. United States,222 Frohwerk v. United
States,223 and Debs v. United States.224 Justice Holmes wrote all three
215

Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 31.
Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32.
217 See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[E]ven imminent
danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions essential to effective
democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and
assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a
relatively trivial harm to society.”).
218 Richards, supra note 10, at 1321-22.
219 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 545-46 (2009) [hereinafter UROFSKY,
A LIFE].
220 Id. at 546.
221 Id. at 548-49. The Selective Service Act allowed the federal government to punish
people who dodged the draft. Id. at 548. The Espionage Act of 1917 punished the making of
false reports that benefited the enemy, harmed the United States by causing disobedience of
soldiers, or obstructed recruitment or enlistment of soldiers. Id. at 548-49. The 1918
Sedition Act targeted activities that included “printing, writing, or publishing any disloyal
. . . language.” UROFSKY, A LIFE, supra note 219, at 549. The Immigration Act of 1918 also
allowed the government to deport non-citizens “who believed in the use of force to
overthrow the government.” Id. at 549.
222 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
223 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
224 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
216
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unanimous rulings that addressed uses of publicity.225 Schenck
addressed whether the First Amendment was violated after two
socialists were indicted under federal law.226 Charles Schenck and
Elizabeth Baer were charged under the Espionage Act of 1917 for
distributing a circular to cause and attempt to cause insubordination
in the U.S. military services and to obstruct the U.S. armed forces’
recruitment and enlistment when the nation was at war.227 They were
also charged with conspiring to mail and mailing the circulars, which
were not mailable under the Espionage Act.228 The majority ruling
affirmed the indictments.229 The majority’s rationale indicated that
the First Amendment does not prevent punishment of words that are
“used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”230 A week later, the
majority affirmed Frohwerk’s conviction for violating the Espionage
Act by preparing and circulating newspaper articles that were
evidence of “a conspiracy to obstruct” the U.S. armed forces’
recruitment.231 On the same day, the majority also confirmed Eugene
Debs’ conviction for attempting to obstruct military recruitment by
delivering speeches.232 In both cases, the defendants’ actions were
treated as threats to the security of the nation during wartime—not
expressions protected by the First Amendment.233 The war also
affected the rulings of the Court at that time. Professor Melvin
Urofsky stated that the Court delayed cases that did not involve
questions for “which the government needed a quick decision.”234
225

Schenck, 249 U.S. 47; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. 204; Debs, 249 U.S. 211.
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48-49.
227 Id. at 48-49.
228 Id. at 49.
229 Id. at 49, 53.
230 Id. at 52 (citations omitted) (stating “We admit that in many places and in ordinary
times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their
constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”).
231 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 204-06, 209-10.
232 Debs, 249 U.S. at 212, 216-17.
233 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 209; Debs, 249 U.S. at 212-13, 216.
234 UROFSKY, A LIFE, supra note 219, at 545.
226
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Brandeis also initially followed the Wilson administration’s wishes
and did not dissent.235
Brandeis and Holmes, however, strayed from the majority
after their thoughts on free expression interests and Espionage
changed after they read Zechariah Chafee’s 1919 article,236 Freedom
of Speech in War Time.237 Chafee described the First Amendment as
“a declaration of national policy in favor of the public discussion of
all public questions.”238 Chafee criticized Holmes’ opinions in
Schenck and Debs for missing an opportunity to clarify what forms of
expression fall inside the protection of the First Amendment and
which ones do not.239 Almost five months after that article was
published in the Harvard Law Review, Brandeis supported Holmes’
dissenting opinion in another Espionage Act case involving
publicity.240 The majority ruling in Abrams v. United States241
confirmed the conviction of five Russian-born defendants involved in
printing and distributing 5,000 circulars that called President Wilson
a “hypocrite and a coward because troops were sent into Russia” 242
and called upon workers to “Rise!” and “Put down your enemy.”243
Holmes, however, reasoned that the language at issue might call upon
workers to strike, but the language did not actually threaten to hinder
the United States’ war efforts.244 The dissenting opinion suggested
that the majority was applying the clear and present danger test too
broadly in this case.245 Holmes wrote that this case was punishing
opinions and freedom of speech should limit punishment of
235

UROFSKY, A LIFE, supra note 219, at 545.
Richards, supra note 10, at 1321-22.
237 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919).
238 Id. at 934.
239 Id. at 943-44.
240 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 616, 624, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
241 Id. at 616.
242 Id. at 616-19, 624. The indictment stated that the circulars included “ ‘disloyal,
scurrilous and abusive language about the form of government of the United States;’ . . .
language ‘intended to bring the form of government of the United States into contempt,
scorn, contumely and disrepute;’ and . . . language ‘intended to incite, provoke and
encourage resistance to the United States’ ” in its war efforts. Id. at 617. They also were
charged with conspiring to “urge, incite and advocate curtailment of production of things and
products, to wit, ordnance and ammunition, necessary and essential to the prosecution of the
war.” Id.
243 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 620.
244 Id. at 626 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
245 Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
236
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expression to “Only the emergency that makes it immediately
dangerous” and the type of “evil” that Congress may correct.246
In 1920, Brandeis wrote a dissenting opinion in another
Espionage Act case involving publicity.247 Scholars suggest that
Brandeis’ change of heart about the importance of freedom of speech
was apparent in Schaefer v. United States,248 in light of Chafee’s
article.249 Brandeis and Holmes agreed with the majority’s dismissal
of the convictions of two people on the basis that the government had
not proven those defendants were involved with publishing false
statements and reports,250 but they dissented from the majority’s
decision that upheld the convictions of an editor and business
manager of German language newspapers under the Espionage
Act.251 Citing Chafee’s article, Brandeis wrote that Chafee had
shown that the clear and present danger must be limited to only
immediate and actual threats of danger.252 Brandeis indicated that the
newspaper articles at issue could not be considered such threats.253
He also challenged the majority’s finding that the news reports
willfully conveyed false reports intended to promote the success of
the United States’ German enemies.254 Brandeis read the English
translation and the original German articles to address the charge of
willful falsity.255 He found the slight variation between the two
works did not provide evidence that the publishers added to the
original dispatch and thus created a false statement.256 Nor did the
mistranslation of the word that means “bread-lines” as “bread riots”

246

Id. at 629-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
248 Id. at 486 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Richards, supra note 10, at 1321-22;
Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civil Courage: The Brandeis Opinion
in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 667 (1988).
249 Chafee, Jr., supra note 237, at 935-36, 952, 966-67.
250 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 482, 493 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“To prosecute men for such publications
reminds of the days when men were hanged for constructive treason. And, indeed, the jury
may well have believed from the charge that the Espionage Act had in effect restored the
crime of constructive treason.”).
252 Id. at 486 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
253 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
254 Id. at 486-87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
255 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 487 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
256 Id. at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
247
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provide evidence of willfully misleading readers to hinder the United
States’ success in the war.257 Brandeis wrote:
To hold that such publications can be suppressed as
false reports, subjects to new perils the constitutional
liberty of the press, already seriously curtailed in
practice under powers assumed to have been conferred
upon the postal authorities. Nor will this grave danger
end with the passing of the war. The constitutional
right of free speech has been declared to be the same
in peace and in war. In peace, too, men may differ
widely as to what loyalty to our country demands; and
an intolerant majority, swayed by passion or by fear,
may be prone in the future, as it has often been in the
past to stamp as disloyal opinions with which it
disagrees.
Convictions such as these, besides
abridging freedom of speech, threaten freedom of
thought and of belief.258
He warned that holding harmless additions or omissions from articles
and expressions of opinion in newspapers eligible for prosecution
“will doubtless discourage criticism of the policies of the
government.”259 In other words, punishing such expression that does
not constitute a clear and present danger might undermine important
duties of publicity by hindering individuals’ willingness to think
about and discuss the government in critical terms as well as
individuals’ ability to access such information via the press.
One week later, Brandeis delivered a dissenting opinion in
Pierce v. United States,260 a case involving the distribution of a fourpage leaflet published by the Socialist party.261 Brandeis objected to
charging the defendants under the Espionage Act for attempting to
cause insubordination and for making false reports and statements
with the intent to interfere with the success of the armed forces.262
Brandeis stated that the government did not provide evidence
indicating that the defendants had the required intent to create a clear

257
258
259
260
261
262

Id. at 492-93 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 494-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 493-94 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
252 U.S. 239 (1920).
Id. at 253-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 253-57 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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and present danger.263 His dissent stated that the test required
evidence of intent to cause and likelihood of causing a clear and
present danger.264 He also indicated that the allegedly false
statements were statements of opinion that interpreted and discussed
“public facts of public interest.”265 He stated that allowing such
statements to be punished “would practically deny members of small
political parties freedom of criticism and of discussion in times when
feelings run high and questions involved are deemed fundamental.”266
He wrote:
The fundamental right of free men to strive for
better conditions through new legislation and new
institutions will not be preserved, if efforts to secure it
by argument to fellow citizens may be construed as
criminal incitement to disobey the existing law—
merely because the argument presented seems to those
exercising judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal
of existing evils, mistaken in its assumptions, unsound
in reasoning or intemperate in language.267
That rationale may be compared to his prior assertion in True
Americanism that all individuals needed equal opportunities to
develop for their own good and the common good in an ideal
American democracy.268
Philippa Strum wrote that Brandeis’ “clerk David Riesman
said that Brandeis had ‘an extraordinary faith in the possibilities of
human development.’ ”269 That faith in individuals is apparent in
Brandeis’ dissenting opinion in Gilbert v. Minnesota.270 That dissent,
released nearly nine months after Brandeis’ dissenting opinion in
Pierce, involved a state statute that made it unlawful to hinder
enlistment in the armed forces as an overreaching statute that
deprived individual liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth
263 Id. at 271-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is not conceivable that any man of ordinary
intelligence and normal judgment would be induced by anything in the leaflet to commit
them and thereby risk the severe punishment prescribed for such offenses. Certainly there
was no clear and present danger that such would be the result.”).
264 Id. at 272-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
265 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 269 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
266 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
268 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 31.
269 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS & PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY 210 (1995).
270 254 U.S. 325, 334-43 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Amendment.271 Since the statute also punished the teaching of
pacifism in any context, Brandeis argued that the statute invaded the
privacy and freedom of the home because it made it unlawful for
individuals to follow their religious beliefs related to pacifism and it
also made it unlawful for parents to teach their children about
pacifism.272 Brandeis also described the statute’s limitations on
speech as an abridgement of individuals’ duty to discuss government
conduct.273 He wrote:
The right of a citizen of the United States to take part,
for his own or the country’s benefit, in the making of
federal laws and in the conduct of the government,
necessarily includes the right to speak or write about
them; to endeavor to make his own opinion
concerning laws existing or contemplated prevail; and,
to this end, to teach the truth as he sees it. Were this
not so, ‘the right of the people to assemble for the
purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of
grievance or for anything else connected with the
powers or duties of the national government’ would be
a right totally without substance. Full and free
exercise of this right by the citizen is ordinarily also
his duty; for its exercise is more important to the
nation than it is to himself. Like the course of the
heavenly bodies, harmony in national life is a resultant
of the struggle between contending forces. In frank
expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest
promise of wisdom in governmental action; and in
suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril. There
are times when those charged with the responsibility
of government, faced with clear and present danger,
may conclude that suppression of divergent opinion is
imperative; because the emergency does not permit
reliance upon the lower conquest of error by truth.
And in such emergencies the power to suppress exists.

271

Id. at 334-40 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The Minnesota statute was, when enacted,
inconsistent with the law of the United States, because at that time Congress still permitted
free discussion of these governmental functions.”).
272 Id. at 335-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
273 Id. at 337-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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But the responsibility for the maintenance of the army
and navy, for the conduct of war and for the
preservation of government, both state and federal,
from “malice domestic and foreign levy,” rests upon
Congress.274
Brandeis stated that the Minnesota statute was not valid because it
interfered with functions reserved for the federal government “and
with the right of a citizen of the United States to discuss them.”275
His reasoning limited the ability of the government to suppress
expression and teaching to emergencies when the suppression was
essential to protect public safety.276 Brandeis’ subsequent dissenting
opinion in Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering,277 however, indicated that
individuals’ rights to pursue self-interests are secondary to their duty
to the well being of society.278
In 1925, Brandeis joined Holmes’ dissenting opinion in
Gitlow v. New York.279 Holmes agreed with the majority’s assertion
“that freedom of speech and of the press . . . are . . . fundamental
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”280 The
dissenting opinion, nonetheless, indicated that the majority opinion
had not correctly applied the clear and present danger test to assess
whether New York’s law unconstitutionally punished Benjamin
Gitlow for publishing The Left Wing Manifesto.281 Holmes wrote:
If what I think the correct test is applied it is manifest
that there was no present danger of an attempt to
overthrow the government by force on the part of the
admittedly small minority who shared the defendant’s
274

Id. at 337-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
276 Id. at 338-39 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
277 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
278 Id. at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating “All rights are derived from the purposes of
the society in which they exist; above all rights rises duty to community. The conditions
developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle
without danger to the community. But it is not for judges to determine whether such
conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of permissible contest and to declare
the duties which the new situation demands. This is the function of the legislature which,
while limiting individual and group rights of aggression and defense, may substitute
processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial by combat.”).
279 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
280 Id. at 666.
281 Id. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
275
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views. It is said that this manifesto was more than a
theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an
incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it
is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or
some failure of energy stifles the movement at its
birth. The only difference between the expression of
an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is
the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence
may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought
of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance
of starting a present conflagration.282
Homes reasoned that freedom of speech meant that people should be
able to express ideas.283
Two years later, in a concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California, Brandeis further clarified that the government could only
be justified restricting incitements to violence that were intended to
and actually likely to cause harm.284 Professor Vincent Blasi noted
that Brandeis’ tone and emphasis changed in that concurrence.285 In
Whitney, the Court found that the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act was not unconstitutionally applied to punish activist Charlotte
Anita Whitney for her involvement in helping organize the
Communist Labor Party of California in 1919.286 Brandeis stated that
he supported the majority ruling because testimony indicated that the
party was engaged in some advocacy that could be considered a clear
and present danger.287 He also wrote that freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly are fundamental rights that government may
restrain if necessary “to protect the State from destruction or from
serious injury, political, economic, or moral.”288 Brandeis then
clarified what would be necessary for the state to prove such
restraints are necessary.289 He wrote:
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear
and present, unless the incidence of the evil
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289

Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
274 U.S. 357, 374-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Blasi, supra note 248, at 666.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372.
Id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 374, 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify
repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be
reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the
command of the Constitution. It is therefore always
open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free
speech and assembly by showing that there was no
emergency justifying it.290
He added that the “evil apprehended” must cause a serious injury and
not merely prevent “a relatively trivial harm to society.”291 Brandeis’
concurrence has provided the foundation for the Court’s modern
conception of freedom of expression.292
Brandeis clarified that the Nation’s founders perceived
freedom of speech and assembly to serve the essential role of
protecting against tyranny from governing majorities. He stated that
government limitations should not prevent freedom of speech and
assembly from serving essential roles in American society.293 He
wrote:
Those who won our independence believed that
the final end of the state was to make men free to
develop their faculties, and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and
courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest
290
291
292
293

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 373, 375-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/13

36

Coyle: Sunlight and Shadows

2017

SUNLIGHT AND SHADOWS

247

menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.294
Thus, his words advocated for the importance of providing
individuals with freedom to assemble and engage in political
discussion.295 He presented freedom to discuss public matters as a
right and a duty of American citizens in order to contribute to the
well being of their democratic state.296 He also presented good
speech as the remedy for bad speech.297
In 1928, Brandeis again addressed, in his Olmstead dissent,
the founders’ motivation to amend the Constitution in order to protect
liberties fundamental to the pursuit of happiness.298 Although that
ruling addressed privacy rights under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments rather than First Amendment freedoms of expression
and assembly, the facts of the case involved the defendants’ rights to
engage in telephone conversations without having government agents
record the conversations and use the recordings as evidence of
criminal activity.299 Brandeis’ dissenting opinion presented the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments as a way to protect individuals against
means the government could use to force self-incrimination.300 He
noted that the Founders “sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations,” recognizing “the
right to be let alone.”301 Thus, the defendants’ constitutional right to
privacy was violated when government actors revoked the
defendants’ freedom to choose whether to share their thoughts,
beliefs, and descriptions of their activities with government actors.302
294

Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
296 Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
297 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating “the fitting remedy for evil counsels is
good ones”).
298 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
299 Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
300 Id. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
301 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
302 See id. at 477-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis also criticized the agents’ actions
that intruded upon the privacy of the defendants and that violated a state law forbidding wire
tapping for failing to follow laws that citizens must follow. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). He wrote:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
295
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Brandeis was concerned about the wrongdoing of the law
enforcement officers who intruded upon the rights of individuals and
whose unwarranted intrusions violated state law and the
Constitution.303
Three years later, Brandeis joined the majority opinion in
Near v. Minnesota304 that also dealt with government actions that
intruded upon fundamental liberties—freedom of speech and of the
press.305 The majority deemed a Minnesota statute unconstitutional,
which allowed newspapers to be enjoined for writing articles that
harmed the reputation of government officials, regardless of whether
the statements were true.306 Although Brandeis did not write an
opinion, he made statements during oral arguments that may shed
light on his separation of tortious wrongs to individuals and society
from exposés that help society by revealing individuals’
wrongdoing.307 In 1931, Brandeis criticized the Minnesota gag law
statute for restricting free expression necessary in a democratic
community.308 When the U.S. Supreme Court considered Near, the
New York Times quoted Brandeis as challenging a Minnesota gag law
because it limited a privilege that seemed critical to having a “free
press and the protection it affords in the democratic community.”309
Brandeis stated that the editors sought to expose the alleged
involvement in criminal activity of “criminals and public officials.”310
“You are dealing here not with a sort of a scandal too often appearing
in the press, and which ought not to appear to the interest of anyone,
but with a matter of prime interest to every American citizen,” he
stated, “They went forward with a definite program and certainly
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare
that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
303 Id. at 472-73, 477-79, 482 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
304 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
305 Id. at 707.
306 Id. at 722-23.
307 Brandeis Criticizes Minnesota Gag Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1931, at 6.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
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they acted with great courage. They invited suit for criminal libel if
what they said was not true.”311 He then asked if the press does not
exist to expose such potential wrongdoing by public officials, “for
what does it exist?”312 Those statements reiterated the importance of
free expression for citizens to learn about government activities and
to be able to discuss such activities in a democratic society.313
Although the ruling deals with libel rather than privacy, his comment
about exposing other types of scandals relates to his previous writing
about invasions of privacy that expose embarrassing information that
is not related to a public or quasi-public interest.314
In 1937, Brandeis addressed privacy and publicity in Senn v.
Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5,315 a 5-4 ruling that did not
support enjoining union members’ lawful picketing of a non-union
business.316 Writing for the majority, Brandeis held a Wisconsin
statute constitutional that permitted unions to use peaceful picketing
and truthful publicity during a labor dispute.317 He indicated that the
facts of this case were not comparable to a 1921 ruling that addressed
picketing involving libelous and disparaging statements and
threats.318 Rather, Senn addressed annoyances arising from the union
members’ disclosing true information about Paul Senn, who owned
and worked in a small tile contracting business that did not employ
union-members.319 Brandeis stated that the annoyance suffered from
such publicity “is not an invasion of the liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution.”320 In a footnote, Brandeis acknowledged that the state
may protect “interests of personality, such as ‘the right of privacy.’
”321 Senn, however, dealt with property interests rather than
personality interests.322 That ruling, thus, favored the right of
publicity to disclose truthful information that addressed commercial

311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322

Id.
Brandeis Criticizes Minnesota Gag Law, supra note 307, at 6.
Id.
See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195 n.7.
301 U.S. 468 (1937).
Id. at 472, 482-83.
Id. at 472, 482-83.
Id. at 479-80 (citing Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921)).
Id. at 473, 482.
Senn, 301 U.S. at 482.
Id. at 482 n.5.
Id. at 477.
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interests rather than private matters that did not harm the type of
privacy rights addressed in The Right to Privacy.323
In summary, Brandeis’ writings acknowledged that freedom
of speech; press; and assembly, much like publicity, could serve as
important means to protect individuals’ liberties to foster the
common good. But excesses, or abuses, of those freedoms that
undermined individual liberty by inciting imminent violence or
invading personal privacy could not be justified when they caused
serious harm to the well being of individuals or government in a
democratic society.
V.

BALANCING PRIVACY AND FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY

Brandeis’ writings suggested that privacy and publicity might
be two sides of a coin essential to an ideal democratic society. He
wrote in a letter to Alice Goldmark that he wanted to write a
companion piece to The Right to Privacy on The Duty of Publicity.324
Warren and Brandeis’ article suggested that legal protection for
thoughts and sensations was necessary for self-development in a
democratic society.325 Publicity and freedom of expression served
specific duties in American democratic society. Brandeis believed
that public opinion and law interacted, and both could be made.326
For Brandeis, the living law was dynamic, subject to change as public
opinion changed.327 His writings, nonetheless, provided some
guidance for balancing free expression and privacy rights, as he
wrote that the exercise of one individual’s rights ended where such
exercise would hinder the exercise of another individual’s rights.328

323

Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196, 198-200; see also,
Richards, supra note 10, at 1334.
324 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 100.
325 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 195-96.
326 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 97 (“All law is a dead letter without public opinion behind it. But law and public
opinion interact—and they are both capable of being made.”).
327 See, e.g., Brandeis, The Living Law, supra note 213, at 461, 464.
328 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32. Brandeis wrote,
Each man may develop himself so far, but only so far, as his doing so
will not interfere with the exercise of a like right by all others. Thus
liberty came to mean the right to enjoy life, to acquire property, to
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Warren and Brandeis likely could not have imagined how sex
tapes now are recorded and, at times, that the moving pictures and
sound recordings would be disclosed publicly without consent during
the twenty-first century. In The Right to Privacy, they addressed the
distribution of a celebrity’s portrait without her approval in the
nineteenth century, stating, “Of the desirability—indeed of the
necessity—of some such protection, there can, it is believed, be no
doubt. The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and of decency.”329 They criticized newspapers
for publishing “details of sexual relations” and gossip, “which [could]
only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle” in the
nineteenth century.330 They suggested that the widespread circulation
of those sensitive details harmed individuals by disclosing
embarrassing information.331 They also presented the circulation of
such information as harmful to society because it “invert[s] the
relative importance of things” and distracts individuals from matters
more relevant to the well being of society.332
The Right to Privacy also clarified nuanced categorizations of
reasonable public information disclosures that were fundamental in a
democracy and the types of unreasonable disclosures of private
information that a state could punish for invading privacy. Warren
and Brandeis indicated that private matters that “should be repressed
may be described as those which concern the private life, habits, acts,
and relations of an individual” when those details “have no legitimate
connection” to a person’s “fitness for a public office” or to a person’s
fitness “for any public or quasi public position . . . which [a person]
seeks or for which [a person] is suggested.”333 Matters also should be
considered private when they “have no legitimate relation to or
bearing upon any act done by him in a public or quasi public
capacity.”334 On the other hand, subjecting information to publicity
may be justified if the released information “is of public or general
interest” or may serve as a means of protecting individuals against
pursue happiness in such manner and to such extent only as the exercise
of a like right by every other of our fellow citizens.
Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32.
329 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.
330 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.
331 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.
332 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.
333 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216.
334 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 216.
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despotism, corruption, exploitation, or incompetence that could harm
society or undermine individual liberty.335 Warren and Brandeis
wrote:
The design of the law must be to protect those persons
with whose affairs the community has no legitimate
concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and
undesired publicity and to protect all persons,
whatsoever; their position or station, from having
matters which they may properly prefer to keep
private, made public against their will. It is the
unwarranted invasion of privacy which is
reprehended, and to be, so far as possible,
prevented. . . . There are persons who may reasonably
claim as a right, protection from the notoriety entailed
by being made the victims of journalistic enterprise.
There are others who, in varying degrees, have
renounced the right to live their lives screened from
public observation.336
Thus, disclosing the intimate details of one’s sexual affairs that
occurred in the seclusion of the private, domestic sphere could be
considered an unreasonable invasion of privacy when the person has
not previously made such information publicly available.337 Similar
disclosures also could be considered unreasonable when such
information did not shed light on the character of a person who either
has assumed or was likely to serve as a public leader or to assume
public responsibility in business or politics.
The Right to Privacy could also be considered a publication
serving the duty of publicity to foster an ideal democratic state.338
Warren and Brandeis’ criticism of invasions of privacy by the Penny
Press was similar in nature to Brandeis’ criticism of excesses and
corruption in business and government, which Brandeis considered
potentially harmful to individuals and the common good in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.339 In December 1890,
335
336
337
338

Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 214-15.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 214-15.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 214-15.
See BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14, at

92.
339

See, e.g., Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14; see also BRANDEIS, CURSE
supra note 120.

OF BIGNESS,
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Brandeis wrote to Alice Goldmark that he would send her the
Harvard Law Review article “to show you how public opinion may
be made.”340 Two months later, Brandeis sent her a letter indicating
his desire to write “ ‘The Duty of Publicity’—a sort of companion
piece to the last one that would really interest me more.”341 That
letter addressed people hiding wickedness and “shielding
wrongdoers,” and presented “the broad light of day” as a remedy that
“would purify them as the sun disinfects.”342 For Brandeis, publicity
was a means to shape public opinion343 in a society that he saw as
“fatally threatened by the ‘excesses’ of capitalism” and by
injustice.344 He wrote articles, speeches, letters, and court opinions
that addressed overreaching and excesses.345 Brandeis presented
secrecy as a potential veil for such wrongdoing, a veil that ought to
be pierced by the sunlight of publicity.346
Later, in his service as a member of the U.S. Supreme Court,
Brandeis focused on the facts of cases that came before the Court.
His early rulings that addressed freedom of expression were shaped
by the context of World War I and a call for unanimity. 347 Some of
his subsequent dissenting opinions reflect concerns about government
actors reaching beyond the roles assigned to them by law. For
instance, his dissenting opinion in Gilbert criticized Minnesota for
passing a statute that limited freedom of speech by prohibiting the
teaching or advocacy of pacifism.348 He called the law inconsistent
with the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, and he indicated
that the State did not have the authority to pass a law related to the
U.S. army and navy, as Congress had that exclusive authority.349

340 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 97.
341 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 100.
342 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Feb. 26, 1891), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 100.
343 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 97.
344 MASON, A FREE MAN’S LIFE, supra note 34, at 104.
345 See, e.g., BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 14; see also BRANDEIS,
CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 120; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472, 485.
346 See, e.g., BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note
14, at 92.
347 UROFSKY, A LIFE, supra note 219, at 545-48.
348 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 336 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
349 Id. at 335-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Brandeis subsequently addressed excesses by government actors in
his Olmstead dissent when he criticized federal prohibition agents for
violating a state law that made recording telephone conversations
unlawful.350 Brandeis suggested that the agents’ actions threatened
the system of American government by applying different standards
to citizens and government employees.351 Brandeis wrote, “Our
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.”352 He suggested that
by ignoring wiretapping laws the agents’ unreasonable actions
suggested that others also might ignore the laws intended to protect
individuals against intrusions upon their private conversations.353 He
voiced concern that the unwarranted electronic intrusions could
record “the most intimate occurrences of the home.”354 Both of these
opinions addressed the potential for government actions to restrain
the exercise of individual privacy rights, specifically, as hindering
individual rights to develop thoughts and beliefs without unwarranted
interference by government.355 In those contexts, the right to privacy
contributed to personal development for an individual and to an
individual’s ultimate ability to contribute to the common good of
society.356
In addition to Brandeis’ Olmstead and Gilbert opinions that
focused on freedom for individual rights to develop their thoughts
and beliefs via expression without unwarranted intrusions from
government,357 Brandeis also made a reference to privacy in a
footnote in Senn.358 Whereas the other two rulings addressed
constitutional rights to privacy, that footnote indicated that states had
authority to address harms to personality rights as invasions of

350

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 480, 482-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 480, 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
352 Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
353 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”).
354 Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
355 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 335-36,
343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
356 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 335-36
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
357 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 337-38
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
358 Senn, 301 U.S. at 472 n.5.
351
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privacy.359 The footnote differentiated those serious harms to
personality from the annoyances that harmed a business owner’s
property rights in the commercial realm.360 On one level, those
rulings echoed Brandeis’ earlier concerns about privacy rights in the
domestic realm, suggesting that Brandeis was concerned about
disclosures of personal information that could thwart selfdevelopment and individuals’ capabilities to participate in democratic
society.
For Brandeis, privacy, publicity, and freedom of expression
for individuals and the press each contributed to individuals’ selfdevelopment and participation in a democratic society.
His
dissenting opinion in Pierce addressed the distribution of a circular
that included opinions and discussions of “public facts of public
interest.”361 He argued that allowing such publications to be
punished would hinder individuals’ willingness and abilities to
criticize and discuss government and harm “[t]he fundamental right
of free men to strive for better conditions.”362 His concurring opinion
in Whitney more emphatically defended the role that freedom of
speech and press serve in a democratic society. 363 He wrote, “public
discussion is a political duty” and “this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government.”364 He proposed that more
speech—not criminal punishment—was the remedy that ought to be
applied to bad speech in the context of seeking political truth.365 In
Pierce and Whitney, however, Brandeis focused on speech about
public matters that could be harmful to public perception of
government—not on disclosures of sensitive personal information
about private individuals.366 When Brandeis focused on freedom of
expression as a means for individuals to learn about wrongdoing and
to discuss reforms, speech and press served important roles to help
form public opinion in a democratic society.

359

Id.
Id.
361 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 269 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
362 Id. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
363 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
364 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
365 Id. at 375, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating “the fitting remedy for evil counsels
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366 Id. at 373, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Pierce, 252 U.S. at 264-67, 272-73
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Warren and Brandeis similarly used the Harvard Law Review
as a vehicle for their expression to seek reform on matters that
harmed individuals and democratic society when they criticized the
Penny Press’ abuses of its power by publishing sensational gossip
and trivial matters that “both belittles and perverts.”367 Brandeis
wrote that the most he and Warren could hope for the essay was “to
start a backfire, as the woodsmen or the prairie men do.”368 Rather,
they have been credited with inspiring a new area of law, 369 an area
that requires judges to engage in nuanced determinations of what
types of invasions of privacy are sufficiently harmful to merit
punishing the publications and potentially chilling future speech or
publications.370 Brandeis indicated that government could limit
individuals’ exercises of those rights when the exercises caused
serious harm to another person, limiting that person’s right to enjoy
life, acquire property, or pursue happiness.371 Brandeis’ dissenting
opinion in Duplex Printing Co., however, stated that individuals’
duties to the well being of society outweigh individuals’ selfinterests.372

367

Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196.
Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1 LETTERS, supra
note 15, at 97.
369 See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 10, at 438; Prosser, supra note 10, at 383-84; Richards,
supra note 10, at 1295-96; Richards & Solove, supra note 10, at 125.
370 Richards, supra note 10, at 1296-97.
371 Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32. Brandeis wrote,
[Each] man may develop himself so far, but only so far, as his doing so
will not interfere with the exercise of a like right by all others. Thus
liberty came to mean the right to enjoy life, to acquire property, to
pursue happiness in such manner and to such extent only as the exercise
of the right in each is consistent with the exercise of a like right by every
other of our fellow citizens. Liberty thus defined underlies twentieth
century democracy.
Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32.
372 Duplex Printing Co., 254 U.S. at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“All rights are derived
from the purposes of the society in which they exist; above all rights rises duty to
community. The conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it
cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community. But it is not for judges to
determine whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of
permissible contest and to declare the duties which the new situation demands. This is the
function of the legislature which, while limiting individual and group rights of aggression
and defense, may substitute processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial by
combat.”).
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Brandeis recognized the press was a valuable tool for
informing citizens and inspiring reform in a democracy.373 The Right
to Privacy was an attempt to deter wrongdoing by newspapers
publishing gossip and personal information by rallying public
opinion—not an attempt to shut down the Penny Press newspapers.
In his dissenting opinion in Schaefer, Brandeis presented a
newspaper’s presentation of opinion and discussion of public matters
as essential for democracy.374 He argued that punishing newspaper
employees for publishing minor errors when reporting material that
could not hinder the nation’s military efforts would “discourage
criticism of the policies of the government,” abridge freedom of
speech, and “threaten freedom of thought and belief.”375 Brandeis
also criticized the Minnesota statute applied to punish a newspaper
publisher for reporting on potential wrongdoing by government
employees when he considered Near.376 Brandeis’ commentary
quoted in the New York Times suggested Brandeis was distinguishing
between types of material that promoted democracy and thus ought to
be published in the press and other stories of scandal that “ought not
to appear to the interest of anyone.”377 Brandeis recognized a role of
the press to expose wrongdoing related to public matters, but not a
role for the press to expose personal details related to home life in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 378
Brandeis’ writings suggest that he might have supported
judgments that punish gossip-publishers for publishing intimate
details from private life, such as sexual affairs, when those details
failed to shed valuable light on a person’s wrongdoing or potential
for wrongdoing in a public position.379 As a jurist, Brandeis
recognized an important role that speech and press play, informing
people and addressing wrongdoing by societal leaders. He also
supported providing individuals with information that would help

373

See, e.g., Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Edwin Munroe Bacon (Aug. 6, 1890),
paraphrased in 1 LETTERS, supra note 15, at 90; Brandeis Criticizes Minnesota Gag Law,
supra note 307, at 6.
374 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 494-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
375 Id. at 494-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
376 Near, 283 U.S. at 697.
377 Id. at 713, 715; Brandeis Criticizes Minnesota Gag Law, supra note 307, at 6.
378 See Near, 283 U.S. at 697; see also Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra
note 12, at 196, 214-16.
379 See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 12, at 196, 214-16.
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them participate in an ideal democratic society. 380 His writings
suggest judges could draw a line between privacy rights and free
expression rights at the point that disclosures would cause serious
harm to individuals that hinders their personal development and
participation in society without addressing matters of public
importance.381

380

Richards, supra note 10, at 1350.
See, e.g., Duplex Printing Co., 254 U.S. at 486, 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Brandeis, True Americanism, supra note 203, at 32; Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, supra note 12, at 215.
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